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ABSTRACT: Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person 
metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for 
propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results 
from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 introduces the four accounts. Section 2 
develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for 
perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g. imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to 
our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. It also considers the model’s 
relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the 
existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood 
development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which 
the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that 
aren’t borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate 
when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers “two systems” accounts of human thinking and 
reasoning, arguing that although there are inrospectable events within System 2, there are no 
introspectable attitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of “unsymbolized thinking”. Section 9 
considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. 
Finally, Section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of 
metacognition without mindreading. 
 
SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-
person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of 
introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own 
attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are 
developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and 
comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence 
of “unsymbolized thinking”, data from schizophrenia, and data from autism. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Human beings are inveterate mindreaders. We routinely (and for the most part unconsciously) 
represent the mental states to the people around us (thus employing metarepresentations—
representations of representational states). We attribute to them perceptions, feelings, goals, 
intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, and we form our expectations accordingly. While it isn’t the 
case that all forms of social interaction require mindreading (many, for example, follow well-
rehearsed “scripts” such as the procedures to be adopted when boarding a bus or entering a 
restaurant), it is quite certain that without it, human social life would be very different indeed. 
But human mental life, too, is richly metarepresentational, containing frequent attributions of 
mental states to ourselves. This sort of first-person metarepresentation is generally referred to as 
“metacognition”. The present target-article is about the cognitive basis (or bases) of our dual 
capacities for mindreading and for metacognition, and the relationships between them. For 
reasons that will emerge in Section 2, however, our main focus will be on propositional attitude 
mindreading and metacognition (involving attributions of beliefs, judgments, intentions, 
decisions, and the like) rather than on our capacities for attributing mental states more generally. 
 
At least four different accounts of the relationships that obtain between mindreading and 
metacognition can be distinguished. Three of them maintain that our access to our own minds is 
quite different in kind from our access to the minds of other people (because involving a form of 
introspection), whereas the fourth (which will be defended here) denies this. The present section 
will provide a brief explanation of each, before making some further introductory comments. 
 
Model #1: two mechanisms. One possibility is that mindreading and metacognition are two 
independent capacities, realized in distinct cognitive mechanisms. This view has been elaborated 
and defended by Nichols and Stich (2003). Their model of the mindreading system is an eclectic 
one, involving both simulation-like aspects and information-rich components (both theory-like 
and modular). There are postulated mechanisms for detecting the perceptual states of other 
people, for detecting the desires of other people, and for detecting the beliefs of other people 
where they differ from our own. A “Possible Worlds Box”, or hypothetical reasoning system, is 
utilized to construct a representation of the world as seen by the other person (containing as 
suppositions the beliefs and goals attributed to the other), and then the subject’s own inferential 
and planning mechanisms are utilized to figure out what else the target might believe, or to work 
out what the target might do. (Crucially, and in distinction from most other forms of simulation 
theory, this stage isn’t supposed to involve introspection of one’s own states.) While most of the 
basic components are held to be innate, there is said to be much work left for learning to do in 
the course of childhood development. 
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When Nichols and Stich (2003) then turn to provide an account of self-awareness, they defend 
the view that there are two (or more) distinct self-monitoring mechanisms. There is at least one 
such mechanism for monitoring and providing self-knowledge of our own experiential states, 
and one (at least) for monitoring and providing self-knowledge of our own propositional 
attitudes. These mechanisms are held to be distinct from one another, and also from the 
mindreading system that deals with the mental states of other people. They are also held to be 
innate, and to emerge under maturational constraints early in infancy. 
 
An account of this sort predicts a double dissociation between mindreading and metacognitive 
capacities. Since these are held to be realized in two (or more) independent mechanisms, there 
should exist cases where each is damaged or interfered with in the absence of damage or 
interference occurring to the other (Sternberg, 2001). So there should be cases of people who can 
attribute mental states to others successfully but who have difficulty in attributing mental states 
to themselves, as well as instances of people who maintain reliable access to their own mental 
states while losing their capacity to attribute such states to other people. Nichols and Stich (2003) 
argue that people with passivity-symptom schizophrenia fit the first profile, whereas autistic 
people fit the second, thus confirming their account. These arguments will be discussed and 
evaluated in due course. 
 
Model #2: one mechanism, two modes of access. A second account maintains that there is just a 
single metarepresentational faculty, but one that has two distinct kinds of access to the mental 
states with which it deals, utilizing distinct informational channels. This single faculty has both a 
perception-based mode, used when interpreting other people, and an introspective mode, used 
when accessing and representing one’s own mental states. Although it is unclear whether such a 
view has ever been defended explicitly in print, it is implicit in Carruthers (1996a), and it is often 
suggested in conversation, especially among those who endorse a “modular” account of the 
mindreading faculty. Moreover, both Frith and Happé (1999) and Happé (2003) are quite 
naturally interpreted in this way (although they might also be read as endorsing model #4).  
 
This account has one significant advantage over the “two independent mechanisms” proposal 
considered above. This is that it provides a smooth and natural explanation of the fact that self-
knowledge and other-knowledge utilize the same conceptual resources. This will be because the 
very same concepts and/or the very same body of “core knowledge” of mental states are housed 
in one and the same metarepresentational faculty, albeit a faculty that has input connections 
deriving not only from the mental states of other people (indirectly, via perception) but also from 
oneself (more directly, via introspection).  
 
This sort of single-mechanism account makes slightly different predictions regarding the 
expected dissociations. Like model #1, it entails that there should be cases where self-knowledge  
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is compromised (because the instrospective inputs to the metarepresentational faculty have been 
disrupted) whereas other-knowledge is intact (because the faculty itself remains undamaged and 
still has access to perceptual input). And it predicts that there should be cases where both self-
knowledge and other-knowledge are compromised, by virtue of damage to the 
metarepresentational faculty itself. (Frith and Happé, 1999, can quite naturally be interpreted as 
arguing that autistic people fit this profile.) But there should be no cases where other-knowledge 
is damaged while self-knowledge is left intact, except by virtue of massive multi-modal 
perceptual failure.
1 These predictions, too, will be examined in due course. 
 
Model #3: metacognition is prior. A third sort of view maintains that metacognition is prior to 
mindreading, in such a way that the attribution of mental states to others depends upon our 
introspective access to our own mental states, together with processes of inference and 
simulation of various sorts. Accounts of this kind have been proposed and defended by Goldman 
(1993, 2006), among others. They also lie behind much of the excitement surrounding the 
discovery of so-called “mirror neurons” (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998). For it is by virtue of awareness of our own action-tendencies, caused by 
observing the actions of others, that we are supposed to gain our initial social understanding. 
 
Goldman’s account of our introspective abilities has evolved over the years. In his 1993 target-
article he thought that our access to our own propositional attitudes was mediated via awareness 
of the phenomenal feelings that are distinctive of them. This view came in for heavy criticism, 
however (Carruthers, 1996b; Nichols and Stich, 2003), and he now maintains that introspection 
utilizes an innate code in the language of thought, whose basic elements are caused by the 
various mental state types, responding to features of their neural realization (Goldman, 2006). 
But the account of mindreading remains essentially the same: one adopts, in imagination, the 
perspective of a target subject, reasons on one’s own behalf within the scope of that imagination 
(hence simulating the reasoning processes of the other), and then introspects the resulting mental 
state of belief or decision, before attributing such a state to the agent in question. 
 
Model #3 makes predictions similar to those of model #2, but with an opposite valence. Both 
accounts agree that there should be cases where both mindreading and metacognition are 
damaged. (In the case of Goldman’s model, this will occur whenever the introspective capacity is 
disrupted, since mindreading is held to be grounded in introspective access to one’s own mind.) 
But instead of predicting that there should be cases where metacognition is poor while 
mindreading is normal, as did model #2, the present account predicts the opposite: that there 
                                                 
1 One might wonder why the dedicated input channels between the various perceptual systems and the 
metarepresentational faculty couldn’t be damaged while leaving those systems themselves intact. The answer is 
that there are no such channels. Rather, the attended outputs of perception are globally broadcast to all conceptual 
systems, including the metarepresentational faculty inter alia. See Section 2 for some discussion and references.  
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should be cases where metacognition is normal while mindreading is damaged. This would 
happen whenever the simulative abilities that are utilized in mindreading are disrupted. 
Following Nichols and Stich (2003), Goldman (2006) argues that autistic people fit this profile. 
 
Model #4: mindreading is prior. A fourth view, in contrast, claims the reverse of the third: 
instead of mindreading being grounded in metacognition, it maintains that metacognition is 
merely the result of us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. A variety of different 
versions of such an account have been proposed (Gopnik, 1993; Gazzaniga, 1995, 2000; 
Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002; Carruthers, 2006; some differences amongst these authors will 
emerge as we proceed).
2 The purpose of the present target article is to explain, elaborate, and 
defend the most plausible variant of this final sort of view. Section 2 will embark on that task. 
 
This fourth account entails that there should be no dissociations between mindreading and 
metacognition. This is because there is just a single faculty involved in both forms of activity, 
utilizing essentially the same inputs, which are all perceptual or quasi-perceptual in character 
(including visual imagery and “inner speech”—see Section 2 below). However, the account also 
predicts that it should be possible to induce subjects to confabulate attributions of mental states 
to themselves by manipulating perceptual and behavioral cues in such a way as to provide 
misleading input to the self-interpretation process (just as subjects can be misled in their 
interpretation of others). Likewise, the account predicts that there should be no such thing as 
awareness of one’s own propositional attitudes independently of any perceptually accessible cues 
that could provide a basis for self-interpretation. The accuracy of these predictions will be 
discussed and evaluated in due course. Note that the “mindreading is prior” account is the only 
one of the four to make such predictions. 
 
Notice that each of the first three accounts described above endorses the existence of some or 
other variety of introspection, understood broadly to encompass any reliable method for forming 
beliefs about one’s own mental states that isn’t self-interpretative and that differs in kind from 
the ways in which we form beliefs about the mental states of other people. (It should be 
emphasized that the term “introspection” is used in this broad, negatively-defined, sense 
throughout this target-article. Many different specific views are thereby included.) Notice that to 
                                                 
2 All of these authors endorse broadly “theory-theory” accounts of mindreading. A very different kind of 
“mindreading is prior” account is defended by Gordon (1986, 1996), who develops a form of simulation theory 
that denies any need for introspection. But this account makes both mindreading and metacognition dependent 
upon the acquisition of natural language. Likewise Dennett (1991) is a sort of theory-theorist who denies 
introspection for attitudes, but he, too, appears to make our knowledge of our own mental states dependent upon 
their expression in language. Discussion of these issues would take us too far afield. For present purposes I shall 
assume, as seems plausible, that basic capacities for both mindreading and metacognition are independent of our 
capacity for natural language.  
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say that an introspective process isn’t self-interpretative doesn’t mean that it isn’t inferential. On 
the contrary, those who take seriously the analogy between introspection and external perception, 
and who think that the former is realized in a self-monitoring mechanism of some sort, are apt to 
think that it achieves its output by effecting computations on the data that it receives as input 
(just as does vision, for example). But these inferences will presumably rely on general 
principles, such as (in the case of vision) that light shines from above, or that moving objects are 
locally rigid. For present purposes an interpretative process, in contrast, will be one that accesses 
information about the subject’s current circumstances, or the subject’s current or recent behavior, 
as well as any other information about the subject’s current or recent mental life. For this is the 
sort of information that we must rely on when attributing mental states to other people. 
 
In contrast with the first three accounts, proponents of view #4, who maintain that metacognition 
results from us turning our mindreading abilities upon ourselves, must deny the existence of 
introspection (at least for a significant class of mental states; see Section 2 below). So also at 
stake in this target-article will be the commonsense view that we have introspective access to our 
own minds (or at least to certain aspects of them). 
 
2.  Elaborating the “mindreading is prior” model 
 
As we noted above, a number of different versions of the “mindreading is prior” view have been 
proposed. These come in different strengths. At one extreme is Gopnik (1993). In her target-
article on this topic she urged that the attribution of all mental states to oneself (with the 
exception, perhaps, of what she described as some sort of “Cartesian buzz”) is equally theory-
based, and equally interpretational. But this strong view has come in for heavy criticism. For as 
Nichols and Stich (2003) and Goldman (2006) both point out, I seem to be able to know what I 
am currently thinking and planning even though I am sitting quiet and motionless (in which case 
there will be no behavior available for the mindreading system to interpret). How is this possible, 
the critics ask, unless we have access to our own mental states that isn’t interpretative, but is 
rather introspective? 
 
At the other extreme lie Wegner (2002) and Wilson (2002), who are often interpreted as 
proponents of a “mindreading is prior” account. Each makes a powerful case that we often 
attribute propositional attitudes to ourselves via self-interpretation (and often false and 
confabulated interpretation, at that). But both seem to allow that we also have access to some of 
our attitudes that is introspective in character. For each allows that we undergo conscious as well 
as unconscious thoughts, and that the former can provide part of the evidence-base for self-
attributing the latter. I shall argue in Section 7 that they have been misled, however, and that they 
have run together the sensory accompaniments of attitudes—such as inner speech and visual 
imagery (to which we do have introspective access, I allow)—with the attitudes themselves.  
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In contrast with the above accounts, the position to be defended in the present target-article is as 
follows. There is just a single metarepresentational faculty, which probably evolved in the first 
instance for purposes of mindreading (or so I shall argue in Section 5). In order to do its work, it 
needs to have access to perceptions of the environment. For if it is to interpret the actions of 
others, it plainly requires access to perceptual representations of those actions.
3 Indeed, I suggest 
that, like most other conceptual systems, the mindreading system can receive as input any 
sensory or quasi-sensory (e.g. imagistic or somatosensory) state that gets “globally broadcast” to 
all judgment-forming, memory-forming, desire-forming, and decision-making systems. (For 
evidence supporting a global broadcasting cognitive architecture, see: Baars, 1988, 1997, 2002, 
2003; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2001, 2003; Baars et al., 2003; Kreiman et 
al., 2003.)  
 
By virtue of receiving globally broadcast perceptual states as input, the mindreading system 
should be capable of self-attributing those percepts in an “encapsulated” way, without requiring 
any other input. Receiving as input a visual representation of a man bending over, for example, it 
should be capable of forming the judgment, “I am seeing a man bending over.” (At least, this 
should be possible provided that the visual state in question has been partially conceptualized by 
other mental faculties, coming to the mindreading system with the concepts man and bending 
over already attached. I shall return to discuss the significance of this point shortly.) This is the 
way in which introspection of perceptual, imagistic, and somatosensory mental events is 
achieved, I suggest. Given that the mindreading faculty possesses the concepts sight, hearing, 
and so forth (together with a concept of self), it should be able to activate and deploy those 
concepts in the presence of the appropriate sort of perceptual input on a recognitional or quasi-
recognitional basis (Carruthers, 2000). Since no appeals to the subject’s own behavior or 
circumstances need to be made in the course of making these judgments, the upshot will qualify 
as a form of introspection, in the broad sense being used here. 
 
Let me stress, however, that what is being offered here is an account of introspection for 
perceptual states, not an account of experiential, or “phenomenal”, consciousness. (And although 
I shall sometimes use the language of “consciousness” in this target-article, this should always be 
understood to mean access consciousness rather than phenomenal consciousness; see Block, 
1995, for the distinction.) Although global broadcasting is often put forward as a theory of 
phenomenal consciousness (Baars, 1988, 1997), that isn’t how it is being used in the present 
context. Rather, it forms part of an account of how we come to have knowledge of our own 
                                                 
3 Note that for this reason Nichols and Stich’s (2003) introduction of a separate perception-monitoring mechanism is 
wholly unnecessary. Since the mindreading system would need to have access to the agent’s own perceptual states 
in order to do its work, there is simply no need for a distinct system to monitor and self-attribute those states.  
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perceptual and quasi-perceptual states. Whether global broadcasting provides a sufficient 
explanation of the “feely” qualities of phenomenal consciousness is another matter entirely. And 
although I myself have defended a higher-order account of phenomenal consciousness, according 
to which it is the availability of globally broadcast states to the mindreading faculty that is 
responsible for their phenomenally conscious status (Carruthers, 2000), I don’t mean to rely on 
that here, either. Indeed, I intend the discussion in this target-article to be neutral between 
proposed explanations of phenomenal consciousness. 
 
While the mindreading system has access to perceptual states, the proposal is that it lacks any 
access to the outputs of the belief-forming and decision-making mechanisms that feed off those 
states. Hence self-attributions of propositional attitude events like judging and deciding are 
always the result of a swift (and unconscious) process of self-interpretation. However, it isn’t just 
the subject’s overt behavior and physical circumstances that provide the basis for the 
interpretation. Data about perceptions, visual and auditory imagery (including sentences 
rehearsed in “inner speech”), patterns of attention, and emotional feelings can all be grist for the 
self-interpretative mill. 
 
Such an account can plainly avoid the difficulties that beset Gopnik (1993). For consider 
someone sitting quietly in his living room, who has just become aware of deciding to walk to his 
study to get a particular book from the shelf (Goldman, 2006, p.230). His mindreading system 
will have access to a variety of forms of evidence in addition to overt behavior (which in this 
case is lacking). The agent might, for example, have verbalized or partially verbalized his 
intention, in “inner speech”. And then since inner speech utilizes the same perceptual systems 
that are involved in the hearing of speech (Paulescu et al., 1993; Shergill et al., 2002), this will 
be available as input to the mindreading system. Or he might have formed a visual or 
proprioceptive image of himself selecting that particular book, which will be similarly available 
(Kosslyn, 1994). Or the context provided by his prior verbalized thoughts and visual images, 
together with a shift in his attention towards the door, might make it natural to interpret himself 
as having decided to walk to his study to collect that particular book.  
 
Notice that allowing the mindreading system to have access to visual imagery, proprioceptive 
data, and emotional feelings is pretty much mandatory once we buy into a global broadcasting 
architecture, even though such events will presumably play little or no role in third-person 
mental-state attribution. For perceptual and quasi-perceptual states of all kinds are capable of 
being globally broadcast when attended to, and will thus become available to any conceptual 
system that looks to such broadcasts for its input. But the upshot is to blur the boundary 
somewhat between the “mindreading is prior” account and model #2 (“one mechanism, two 
modes of access”). For we now have to concede that the mindreading system does have available 
to it information when attributing mental states to the self that it never has access to when  
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attributing mental states to others. For unless subjects choose to tell me, I never have access to 
what they are imagining or feeling; and certainly I never have the sort of direct access that my 
mindreading system has to my own visual images and bodily feelings. 
 
Despite this “blurring of boundaries”, there remains good reason to insist on the distinctness of 
our account from model #2. This is because the latter is committed to the claim that the 
metarepresentational faculty has introspective, non-interpretative, access to mental states of all 
types, including propositional attitudes as well as sensory experiences. The account being 
proposed here, in contrast, maintains that our access to our own propositional attitudes is always 
interpretative, while conceding that the evidence-base for self-interpretation is somewhat wider 
than we normally have available when interpreting other people. 
 
One final point needs to be emphasized: as the example of seeing a man bending over should 
make clear, the thesis that judgments aren’t introspectable requires important qualification. In 
particular, it should be restricted to judgments that aren’t perceptual judgments. According to 
Kosslyn (1994) and others, the initial outputs of the visual system interact with a variety of 
conceptual systems that deploy and manipulate perceptual templates, attempting to achieve a 
“best match” with the incoming data. When this is accomplished, the result is globally broadcast 
as part of the perceptual state itself. Hence we see an object as a man or as bending over. Since 
this event is apt to give rise immediately to a stored belief, it qualifies as a (perceptual) 
judgment. But since it will also be received as input by the mindreading system (by virtue of 
being globally broadcast), it will also be introspectable. In the discussion that follows, therefore, 
whenever I speak of “judgments” I should be understood to mean “non-perceptual judgments”, 
such as the judgment that seventeen is a prime number, or that polar bears are endangered.
4 
 
2.1.  Mindreading and speech 
 
If we lack introspective access to our own propositional attitudes, then how is it that we can 
report on those attitudes, swiftly and unhesitatingly, in the absence of anything that could 
plausibly be seen as input to a process of self-interpretation? If someone asks me for the date on 
which I think the Battle of Hastings took place, for example, I can reply immediately, “Ten 
sixty-six, I believe.” But on what basis could I interpret myself as possessing such a belief? I can 
recall no Battle-of-Hastings-related behavior; and there need have been nothing relevant of an 
                                                 
4 In allowing that perceptual judgments are introspectable I don’t mean to imply that perceptually-based beliefs are 
likewise introspectable. On the contrary, once formed and stored, the only way that those beliefs can be 
consciously accessed is via their expression in visual imagery (in the form of an episodic memory, perhaps) or in 
inner speech. But such events, although introspectable, will need to be interpreted to extract the information that 
they are, indeed, expressive of belief (as opposed, for example, to supposition or mere idle fantasy). See Section 
2.1 for further discussion.  
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imagistic sort passing through my mind at the time, either. 
 
There is surely no reason to think, however, that the verbal expression of a belief requires prior 
metacognitive access to it. Rather, one’s executive systems will conduct a search of memory, 
retrieving an appropriate first-order content which can then, in collaboration with the language 
faculty, be formulated into speech. And then attaching the phrase, “I think that …” or “I believe 
that …” to the first-order sentence in question is a trivial matter (Evans, 1982), and is often a 
mere manner of speech or a matter of politeness (so as not to appear too confident or too 
definite). It certainly needn’t require that subjects should first formulate a metacognitive 
judgment to the effect that they believe the content in question. Hence it may be that the first 
metacognitive access that subjects have to the fact that they have a particular belief is via its 
verbal expression (whether overtly or in inner speech). And such speech, like all speech, will 
need to be interpreted to extract its significance. 
 
General considerations of cognitive engineering support such a view. For we already know that 
executive systems would need to have access to stored information, and that they would have 
been honed by evolution to conduct efficient searches for the information required to solve each 
type of practical task in hand. Moreover, this capacity would surely have been of ancient 
evolutionary provenance, long pre-dating the emergence of language and mindreading. Nor does 
it qualify as a form of introspection, since it isn’t metarepresentational in character. When the 
mindreading system was added in the course of human evolution, therefore, there would have 
been no need for it to be built with its own capacities to conduct searches of all memory; and on 
the contrary, since all data-mining is computationally expensive, this would have come at 
significant additional cost. And while there is every reason to think that capacities for language 
and for mindreading would have co-evolved (Gomez, 1998; Origgi and Sperber, 2000), there 
isn’t any reason to think that the language faculty can only produce an output when provided 
with a metacognitive content as input, either issued by the mindreading faculty or by a separate 
faculty of introspection.  
 
Many cognitive scientists think that the speech-production process begins with a thought-to-be-
expressed (Levelt, 1989). I myself believe that this is an exaggeration (Carruthers, 2006). Speech 
is an action, and like other actions can be undertaken for a variety of purposes (the expression of 
belief being only one of them). Hence any utterance in the indicative mood will need to be 
interpreted to determine whether it is made ironically, or in jest, or as a mere supposition; or 
whether it is, indeed, expressive of belief. However, I know of no theorist who thinks that speech 
needs to begin from a metacognitive representation of the thought to be expressed. So even 
utterances that do express a corresponding belief don’t qualify as a form of introspection, since 
no metarepresentational thought occurs until one’s own words are heard and interpreted. 
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Similar points hold in respect of the verbal expression of desire. No doubt we often give voice to 
our desires having first envisaged the thing or circumstance in question and monitored and 
interpreted our affective responses, in the manner proposed by Damasio (1994, 2003). (This is, 
of course, fully consistent with a “mindreading is prior” account.) But often our current desires 
can recruit appropriate speech actions in their own service, with use of the terminology of “want” 
or “desire” being just one possible means among many. Thus the two-year-old child who says, “I 
want juice”, is unlikely to have first formulated a metacognitive thought. Rather, desiring juice, 
the child is seeking ways to achieve that goal. And for these purposes a number of different 
speech actions might be equally effective, including, “Give me juice”, “Juice please”, and so on. 
If she chooses to say, “I want juice”, then she does make an assertion with a metacognitive 
content, and hence (if she understands the concept of wanting) she will subsequently come to 
entertain a metacognitive thought. But there is no reason to think that her utterance must begin 
with such a thought, any more than does the utterance of someone who answers the question, “Is 
it the case that P?” by saying, “Yes, I believe that P.” 
 
It might be objected that even if we sometimes learn of our own beliefs and desires by first 
becoming aware of their formulation into speech (whether inner or outer), this still gives us 
reliable, non-interpretative, access to them. Hence this can still count as a form of introspection. 
But this appearance of immediacy is illusory. All speech—whether the speech of oneself or 
someone else—needs to be interpreted before it can be understood. Unless we beg the point at 
issue, and assume that subjects have direct introspective access to their own articulatory 
intentions, the language-comprehension system will need to get to work on the utterance in the 
normal way, figuring out its meaning in light the utterance’s linguistic properties (lexical 
meanings, syntax, and so forth) together with knowledge of context. And even if, as is likely, the 
result of this process (the content of the utterance) is attached to the existing representation of the 
sound of the utterance and globally broadcast to all conceptual systems including the 
mindreading faculty, the latter will still only have interpretative access to the underlying beliefs 
or goals that initiated the utterance. 
 
But how is it, then, that our own utterances aren’t ambiguous to us, in the way that the utterances 
of other people often are? If I find myself thinking, “I shall walk to the bank”, then I don’t need 
to wonder which sort of bank is in question (a river bank, or a place where one gets money). And 
this fact might be taken to indicate that I must have introspective access to my intentions. 
However, there will generally be cues available to disambiguate our own utterances, which 
wouldn’t be available to help interpret the similar utterances of another. For example, just prior 
to the utterance I might have formed a visual image of my local bank, or I might have activated a 
memory image of an empty wallet. But even when no such cues are available, there remains a 
further factor that will serve to disambiguate my own utterances, but which won’t always help 
with the utterances of others. This is the relative accessibility of the concepts involved, which is  
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a pervasive feature of speech comprehension generally (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Since the 
goals that initiated the utterance, “I shall walk to the bank”, would almost certainly have 
included an activation of one or other specific concept bank, this will insure the increased 
accessibility of that concept to the comprehension system when the utterance is processed and 
interpreted.  
 
I conclude, therefore, that while subjects can often express their beliefs in speech, and can hence 
acquire more-or-less reliable information about what they believe, this gives us no reason to 
think that introspection for propositional attitudes exists. 
 
3.  The introspective intuition 
 
There is no doubt that the denial of introspection for propositional attitudes, entailed by the 
“mindreading is prior” view, is hugely counterintuitive to most people. Almost every philosopher 
who has ever written on the subject, for example—from Descartes (1637), Locke (1690), and 
Kant (1781), though to Searle (1992), Shoemaker (1996), and Goldman (2006)—has believed 
that many (at least) of our own judgments and decisions are immediately available to us, known 
in a way that is quite different from our knowledge of the judgments and decisions of other 
people. We are (pre-theoretically) strongly inclined to think that we don’t need to interpret 
ourselves in order to know what we are judging or deciding (or that we don’t need to do so all of 
the time, at least—many of us now have enough knowledge of cognitive science to concede that 
such events can also occur unconsciously). Rather, such events are often (somehow) directly 
available to consciousness. Since it is generally thought to be a good thing to preserve intuitions 
ceteris paribus, this might be taken to create a presumption in favor of one of the three 
alternative accounts that we considered at the outset. The strategy of this section is to draw the 
teeth from this argument by showing, first, that the intuition underlying it is unwarranted, and 
then by using reverse engineering to explain why (from the perspective of a “mindreading is 
prior” account) it nevertheless makes good sense that such a folk-intuition should exist.  
 
3.1.  The subjective experience of introspective access isn’t evidence of introspection 
 
The thesis expressed in the section-title above is clearly demonstrated by research with 
commissurotomy (“split-brain”) subjects, conducted over many years by Gazzaniga (1995, 2000) 
and colleagues. In one famous case (representative of many, many, others of similar import) 
Gazzaniga (1995) describes how different stimuli were presented to the two half-brains of a split-
brain patient simultaneously. The patient fixated his eyes on a point straight ahead, while two 
cards were flashed up, one positioned to the left of fixation (which would be available only to the 
right brain) and one to the right of fixation (which would be available only to the left brain). 
When the instruction, “Walk!” was flashed to the right brain, the subject got up and began to  
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walk out of the testing van. (The right brain of this subject was capable of some limited 
understanding of language, but had no production abilities.) When asked why, he (the left brain, 
which controlled speech-production as well as housing a mindreading system) replied, “I’m 
going to get a Coke from the house.” This attribution of a current intention to himself is plainly 
confabulated, but delivered with all of the confidence and seeming introspective obviousness as 
normal. 
 
It is important to note that while commissurotomy patients can often have good understanding of 
their surgery and its effects, they never say things like, “I’m probably choosing this because I 
have a split brain and the information went to the right, non-verbal, hemisphere” (Gazzaniga, 
1995). On the contrary, they make their confabulated reports smoothly and unhesitatingly, and 
their (their left brain’s) sense of self seems quite unchanged following the operation. Even 
reminders of their surgery during testing have no effect. On a number of occasions testing was 
paused and the experimenter said something like, “Joe, as you know you have had this operation 
that sometimes will make it difficult for you to say what we show you over here to the left of 
fixation. You may find that your left hand points to things for that reason, OK?” Joe assents, but 
then on the very next series is back to showing the interpreter effect once again (Gazzaniga, 
personal communication). If patients were aware of interpreting rather than introspecting, then 
one would expect that a reminder of the effects of commissurotomy would enrich the hypothesis 
pool, and would sometimes lead them to attribute some of their own behavior to that. But it 
doesn’t. 
 
Of course it doesn’t follow from the extensive commissurotomy data that normal human subjects 
never have privileged, non-interpretative, access to their own judgments and decisions, as 
Goldman (2006) points out. (And for this reason the defense of a “mindreading is prior” account 
that is mounted by Gazzaniga, 1998, strikes many people as massively under-supported. One 
way of viewing the present target-article is that it is an attempt to rectify that deficiency.) 
Gazzaniga’s data were collected from patients who had undergone serious brain damage (a 
severed corpus collosum). Hence it may be that in normal brains the mindreading system does 
have immediate access to the agent’s judgments and intentions. The split brain data force us to 
recognize that sometimes people’s access to their own judgments and intentions can be 
interpretative (much like their access to the judgments and intentions of other people), requiring 
us at least to accept what Goldman (2006) calls a “dual method” theory of our access to our own 
thoughts. But one could believe (as Goldman does) that introspection is the normal, default, 
method for acquiring knowledge of our own propositional attitudes, and that we only revert to 
self-interpretation as a back-up, when introspection isn’t available. 
 
The split-brain data show decisively that we don’t have any introspective, subjectively 
accessible, warrant for believing that we ever have introspective access to our own judgments  
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and decisions, however. This is because patients report plainly-confabulated explanations with 
all of the same sense of obviousness and immediacy as normal people. And if normal people 
were to rely upon subjectively accessible cues to identify cases of introspection, then 
commissurotomy patients should be able to use the absence of such cues to alert them to the 
interpretative status of their reports. The best explanation is therefore that subjects themselves 
can’t tell when they are introspecting and when they are interpreting or confabulating. So for all 
we know, it may be that our access to our own judgments and decisions is always interpretative, 
and that we never have introspective access to them. Now philosophers will note, of course, that 
given so-called “reliabilist” conceptions of knowledge and justification, we might count as 
knowing, and as justified in believing in, the existence of introspection, despite our inability to 
discriminate cases of introspection from cases of confabulation. This will be so provided that 
introspection really does exist and is common, and provided that our belief in it is reliably caused 
by the fact that we do often introspect, and is caused in the right sort of way. My point here, 
however, is that our inability to discriminate shows that we have no subjectively accessible 
reason to believe in the existence of introspection. So anyone who is wondering whether or not 
introspection is real should realize that they have no reason that they can offer for thinking that it 
is, in advance of examining the evidence. 
 
3.2  The mindreading system’s model of its own access to the mind 
 
The intuition that there is introspection for propositional attitudes is unwarranted, then. But in 
addition, we can explain why we should have such an intuition in the first place, even if (as I am 
suggesting) it turns out to be false. This is because the mindreading system’s operations will be 
greatly simplified, but without any significant loss of reliability (and perhaps with some gain), if 
its model of its own access to the mind is an introspective (non-interpretative) one. We should 
then predict that just such a model would be arrived at, whether by natural selection or through 
individual learning. This argument is laid out in some detail in Carruthers (2008b). In 
consequence, this section will be brief.
5 
 
In order to be effective, the mindreading system needs to contain some sort of model of the way 
that minds, in general, work. Such a model should include an account of the access that agents 
have to their own mental states. And here there are essentially two choices. The mindreading 
system can either represent agents as interpreters of themselves, or it can picture them as having 
direct introspective access to their own mental states. The former would complicate the 
mindreading system’s computations, and would mandate consideration of a wider range of 
                                                 
5 An alternative account to the one sketched here is outlined by Wilson (2002), who suggests that the introspective 
assumption may make it easier for subjects to engage in various kinds of adaptive self-deception, helping them to 
build and maintain a positive self-image. In fact, both accounts might be true.   
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evidence, taking into account the possibility of misinterpretation. But there is unlikely to be any 
compensating gain in reliability. One reason for this is that people are, probably, excellent 
interpreters of themselves. (We know that they are remarkably good interpreters of others.) 
Hence in normal circumstances instances of confabulation will be rare, and thus any errors 
introduced by a belief in introspection will be few. A second reason is that self-attributions of 
mental states, even if initially confabulated, are likely to be self-fulfilling. This is because agents 
will feel obliged to act in ways that are consistent with the mental states that they have attributed 
to themselves. And a third reason is that any expansion in the computational complexity of a 
system will introduce additional sources of error (as well as imposing a cost in terms of speed of 
processing, of course), as will any increase in the types of evidence that need to be sought. It is 
now a familiar point in cognitive science, not only that simple (but invalid) heuristics can prove 
remarkably reliable in practice, but that they can often out-compete fancier computational 
processes once the costs imposed by computational errors, as well as missing or misleading 
information, are factored in (Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
6 What we should predict, therefore, is that 
the mindreading system should model the mind as having introspective access to itself. And then 
that very same model will render agents blind to the fact (if it is a fact) that their mode of access 
to their own mental states is actually an interpretative one. 
 
I conclude that the playing field is now leveled between the competing theories, in the sense that 
there is no initial presumption against model #4. And given a level playing field, we should 
prefer the simplest theory ceteris paribus. This means that the “mindreading is prior” account 
should now be our default option, since it postulates just a single mechanism with a single mode 
of access to its domain, whereas the other accounts postulate greater complexity. 
 
4.  The data from development 
 
Gopnik (1993) bases much of her case for a “mindreading is prior” account on developmental 
evidence, claiming that there is a parallelism between children’s performance in mindreading 
tasks and matched metacognitive tasks (see also Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1994). This claim has 
held up well over the years. In an extensive meta-analysis of hundreds of experiments, Wellman 
et al. (2001) are able to find no evidence of any self / other asymmetry in development. Taken at 
face value, these data count strongly against both a “two independent mechanisms” account and 
a “metacognition is prior” view, each of which predicts that metacognitive competence should 
emerge in development in advance of mindreading. 
 
What most parties in these debates have overlooked, however, is the existence of the remaining 
                                                 
6 We also know that in other domains—such as physics—the unconscious theories that guide behavior will often 
make false, but simplifying, assumptions. See, for example, McCloskey (1983).  
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alternative to a “mindreading is prior” account, namely the “one mechanism, two modes of 
access” view. For this, too, predicts that development in the domains of both self- and other-
understanding should proceed in parallel. Like the “mindreading is prior” view, this account 
claims that there is just a single mechanism or body of core knowledge underlying both 
mindreading and metacognitive competence. Hence one would expect children’s capacities in 
both domains to emerge at about the same time. What this means is that developmental evidence 
is inherently incapable of discriminating between views that endorse, and those that deny, the 
existence of introspective access to propositional attitudes. 
 
There is another, equally important, reason why developmental evidence is of no use to us in this 
inquiry, however. This is that all parties in the debate over the existence of introspection for 
attitudes have shared a traditional and widely accepted understanding of the developmental 
timetable for mindreading competence (Gopnik, 1993; Nichols and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 
2006). This was thought to proceed through well-defined stages over the first four or five years 
of life, with competence in false-belief reasoning not emerging until after the age of four 
(Wellman, 1990). Yet there have always been those who have maintained that an underlying 
competence with false-belief might be present much earlier, but masked by young children’s 
difficulties in executive functioning (Fodor, 1992; Leslie and Polizzi, 1998). Indeed, Birch and 
Bloom (2004, 2007) refer to the latter as “the curse of knowledge”, pointing out that adults, too, 
can often have difficulty in allowing for the false beliefs of another. And this general perspective 
has now received dramatic confirmation through the use of non-verbal looking-time and 
expectation measures. These show competence with false-belief understanding and other 
allegedly late-emerging aspects of mindreading capacity at around fifteen or twenty-four months, 
long before this had traditionally been thought possible (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Bosco et 
al., 2006; Onishi et al., 2007; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; Song and Baillargeon, 
forthcoming; Song et al., forthcoming). But no one has, as yet, been able to develop non-verbal 
measures of metacognitive understanding in infants for purposes of comparison. 
 
Of course there is much, here, that needs to be explained. In particular, if metarepresentational 
competence is present in the second year of life, we want to know why it takes two or more 
additional years for that competence to manifest itself in verbally-based tasks. But this isn’t a 
question for us. Our focus is on adjudicating between accounts that endorse the existence of 
introspection and those that deny it. And for these purposes it is plain that we need to seek 
evidence of other sorts. 
 
5.  The evolution of mindreading and metacognition 
 
The differing accounts outlined in Section 1 lead to different commitments concerning the likely 
course of human evolution, and these in turn lead to different predictions about what we should  
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expect to find in contemporary human cognition, and also in other species of animal. The present 
section will show that the “mindreading is prior” account comes out significantly ahead of its 
rivals in the former respect, before arguing that the animal data lend no support to either side. 
 
All four of the accounts of the relationship between mindreading and metacognition can, and 
probably should, converge on essentially the same explanation of the evolutionary origins of 
human mindreading capacities. (Even those who think that mindreading capacities emerge in the 
course of childhood development through processes of learning that are akin to scientific 
theorizing insist that such theorizing has to begin with a specific innate basis; see Gopnik and 
Meltzoff, 1997.) This will be some or other variant of the “Machiavellian intelligence” 
hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988, 1997; Dunbar, 2000), which points to the immense fitness 
advantages that can accrue to effective mindreaders amongst highly social creatures such as 
ourselves. And all should predict that one might expect to find simpler versions of mindreading 
capacity amongst other animals (perhaps confined to recognition of perceptual access and 
ignorance together with intention), especially amongst mammals who live in complex social 
groups. These predictions appear to be borne out (Hare et al., 2000, 2001; Tomasello et al., 
2003a, 2003b; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007; Hare, 2007; Call and Tomasello, 2008). 
 
Where the various accounts diverge is over the evolution of metacognition. From the perspective 
of a “mindreading is prior” account, no separate story needs to be told. Since metacognition, on 
this view, results from turning one’s mindreading capacities upon oneself, its emergence will be 
a byproduct of the evolution of mindreading. (This isn’t to say that metacognition might not have 
come under secondary selection thereafter, perhaps by virtue of helping to build and maintain a 
positive self-image, as Wilson, 2002, suggests.) All three competitor accounts, in contrast, have 
some explaining to do. This is most obvious in connection with a “two independent 
mechanisms” account of the sort championed by Nichols and Stich (2003). For if mindreading 
and metacognition are subserved by two (or more) cognitive mechanisms, then plainly there 
should be a distinct evolutionary story to be told about the emergence of each. But the same also 
holds in respect of a “one mechanism, two modes of access” account. Since neural connections 
are costly to build and maintain (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995), some distinct evolutionary pressure 
will be needed to explain why the metarepresentational faculty (which might well have evolved 
initially for purposes of mindreading) should have acquired the input channels necessary to 
monitor the subject’s own propositional attitudes. 
 
The most natural way of explaining the structures postulated by the “metacognition is prior” 
account (championed by Goldman, 2006) would likewise involve a distinct evolutionary pressure 
of some sort for the emergence of metacognition. The latter would happen first, followed 
subsequently by the integration of introspection with processes of imagination and simulative 
reasoning, presumably driven by the pressure to develop forms of “Machiavellian intelligence”.  
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Would it be possible to argue, however, that metacognitive capacities evolved to subserve 
mindreading from the start? It might be suggested that each incremental increase in 
metacognitive capacity was selected for because of its role in mindreading. In order for this 
account to work, however, it would have to be supposed that capacities to identify with others in 
imagination, together with dispositions to think and reason in simulation of the other within the 
scope of such a pretence, were already in place in advance of the appearance of both 
metacognition and mindreading. And one then wonders what such capacities would have been 
for. In the absence of any plausible suggestions, therefore, I shall assume that the “metacognition 
is prior” account, like the other two introspection-involving views, needs to postulate some 
evolutionary pressure in addition to those that issued in mindreading. 
 
All three of the competitor accounts need to tell some story about the evolution of introspection, 
then. What I shall argue in Section 5.1 is that the most popular such story—that metacognition 
evolved for purposes of self-monitoring and executive control of our own cognitive processes—
makes predictions that aren’t borne out by the data. To the extent that this is true, then each one 
of those accounts is simultaneously disconfirmed. And this will therefore provide us with a 
further reason to accept the “mindreading is prior” account (in addition to the fact that it is the 
simplest, and should in consequence be accepted by default). 
 
Although all three competitor accounts are committed to the existence of a distinct evolutionary 
pressure to explain the emergence of metacognition, only the “metacognition is prior” model 
makes a specific prediction about the order of emergence of the two capacities in phylogeny. It 
predicts, in particular, that we should be able to find metacognitive capacities in creatures that 
lack any capacity for mindreading (presumably because they lack the requisite imaginative 
abilities). Just this idea appears to motivate the recent flurry of interest in the metacognitive 
capacities of non-human animals (Terrace and Metcalfe, 2005). This topic will be examined in 
Section 5.2.  
 
5.1.  The evolution of metacognition 
 
What evolutionary pressures might have shaped the emergence of a distinct metacognitive 
capacity? One natural and very popular suggestion is that it was designed to have a supervisory 
role with respect to regular, first-order, cognitive processes—trouble-shooting and intervening in 
those processes in cases of difficulty, initiating new strategies, checking that tasks are proceeding 
as expected, and so on and so forth (Shallice, 1988). What I shall argue, however, is that while 
there is indeed a supervisory role for metacognition, it is one that doesn’t require an introspective 
capacity distinct from the third-person mindreading system. I shall argue, in addition, that our 
metacognitive interventions aren’t capable of the sort of direct impact on cognitive processing 
that would be predicted if metacognition had, indeed, evolved for the purpose. But we first need  
  19 
to notice an important distinction. 
 
Unfortunately, cognitive scientists use the term “metacognition” in two quite distinct ways, often 
without noticing the difference. (See Anderson and Perlis, 2005, for an especially egregious 
example. For distinctions related to the one drawn here, see Dennett, 2000.) Generally the term is 
used, as it has been throughout this target-article, to mean cognition about one’s own cognition. 
Metacognition, in this sense, is inherently higher-order, involving metarepresentations of one’s 
own first-order cognitive processes as such. But the word “meta” literally just means “above”. 
And consequently many people understand metacognition to be any process that goes on above 
regular cognitive processes, performing a number of kinds of executive-function roles, such as 
monitoring the progress of a task and initiating new strategies when progress is blocked. On this 
view, any cognitive architecture that is organized into layers, containing not only a set of 
automatic information-generating and decision-making systems, but also a supervisory layer of 
some sort that can intervene in or alter the processes taking place in the first layer, will count as 
“metacognitive”. But it is important to see that these supervisory processes needn’t involve 
anything metacognitive in our first sense. For example, monitoring the progress of a task may 
just require a (first-order) representation of the goal-state, together with some way of comparing 
the current output of the system with the represented goal-state and making adjustments 
accordingly.  
 
Indeed, all of the supervisory processes that Anderson and Perlis (2005) describe as requiring 
both “self-awareness” and a “metacognitive loop” are actually just first-order processes 
organized into layers in this sort of way. For example, they describe a robot that is capable of 
noticing that it is no longer making forward progress (because it keeps bumping into a fence that 
it cannot see), and initiating an alternative strategy (e.g. traveling in an alternative direction for a 
while). There is plainly nothing metacognitive (in the sense of “metarepresentational”) required 
here. The robot just needs to be on the lookout for failures to move forwards, and it needs to 
have been programmed with some alternative strategies to try when it doesn’t. Even a 
mechanism that is capable of recognizing and responding to contradictions need only be 
sensitive to the formal properties of the representations involved, without representing them as 
representations. Thus if representations of the form “P” and “~P” are detected within active 
memory, the system might be programmed to place no further reliance on either of these 
premises, just as Anderson and Perlis suggest. 
 
A significant portion of what gets described within cognitive science as “metacognition”, then, 
should be set aside as irrelevant to the issues that we are discussing. But of course a very large 
body of genuinely metacognitive data remains, especially in the domain of metamemory (e.g. 
Nelson, 1992; Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1994). But even where cognitive processes are 
genuinely metacognitive in the sense of being metarepresentational, deploying concepts of  
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mental state types, they often operate without the capacity to intervene directly in the states and 
processes represented. For example, most metamemory capacities only require an ability to 
initiate or to intervene in behavior. Thus a child might select one memorization task rather than 
another on the grounds that it contains fewer items (thus implicating knowledge about memory, 
but not intervening in the process of memory itself). And likewise someone might mentally 
rehearse items in inner speech as an aid to memorization, which is an indirect behavioral 
influence on memory, not a direct intervention. And in the same spirit, it should be noted that 
while the intention to learn has an effect on study patterns, it has no effect on learning and recall 
once study patterns are controlled for (Anderson, 1995). This is not what one would predict if 
metamemory were some sort of introspective capacity that had evolved for purposes of executive 
control, enabling subjects to intervene directly in the processes of memorization or memory 
retrieval. (Guiding behaviors that tend to issue in memorization or retrieval, in contrast, can 
equally well be done by a mindreading system.) 
 
Koriat et al. (2006) review much of the extensive literature on metamemory, and experimentally 
contrast two competing models. One is that metacognitive monitoring serves the function of 
controlling and directing the underlying cognitive processes. (Plainly this would be consistent 
with the evolutionary explanation of introspection sketched above.) The other is that 
metacognitive judgments are evidence-based, cued by experiences that are caused by the 
cognitive processes in question. (This would be consistent with the self-interpretative position 
being developed here.) While they do find metacognitive phenomena that fit the former profile, 
none of these suggests any real role for introspection of attitudes. Rather, they include such 
phenomena as allocating greater study time to items that attract a larger reward. In contrast, there 
is extensive evidence of cue-based metacognitive judgments. Thus feelings of knowing are often 
based on the ease with which one can access fragments of the target knowledge (Koriat, 1993) or 
items related to the target (Schwartz and Smith, 1997). And judgments of learning made during 
or after study are based on the “fluency” with which items are processed during study itself 
(Begg et al., 1989; Benjamin and Bjork, 1996; Koriat, 1997). Again, this isn’t at all what one 
would predict if one thought that a capacity for introspection of attitudes had evolved for 
purposes of metacognitive control. For why, in that case, would one need to rely on indirect cues 
of learning? 
 
While the influence of metacognitive judgments on cognitive processes is often indirect, it 
should be stressed that such judgments are actually intrinsic to the sorts of processes that would 
be characterized as belonging to “System 2”, as we will see in Section 7. Human beings 
sometimes engage in forms of conscious thinking and reasoning that are thoroughly imbued with 
metacognitive beliefs and judgments. But what appears to make such forms of thinking 
consciously accessible is that they are conducted in inner speech and other kinds of imagery. In 
which case the type of metacognitive access that we have, here, will turn out to be fully  
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consistent with a “mindreading is prior” account. 
 
The preliminary upshot of this discussion, then, is that the predictions generated by the most 
common evolutionary explanation of an introspective capacity (namely, that its purpose is 
executive monitoring and control) aren’t borne out by the data. This provides us with good 
reason to embrace the alternative “mindreading is prior” account instead. 
 
5.2.  Metacognitive processes in non-human animals 
 
The last few years have seen a flurry of experiments purporting to demonstrate the presence of 
metacognitive processes in non-human animals (Smith et al., 1995, 1997, 2003; Shields et al., 
1997; Call and Carpenter, 2001; Hampton, 2001, 2005; Hampton et al., 2001; Smith, 2005; Son 
and Kornell, 2005; Beran et al., 2006; Washburn et al., 2006; Kornell et al., 2007). If these 
experiments were to prove successful, and if the animals in question were to lack any capacity 
for mindreading of attitudes (as most researchers assume), then this would provide dramatic 
support for the view that metacognition is prior to and underpins mindreading. (By the same 
token, it would provide powerful evidence against the “mindreading is prior” account being 
defended here.) These studies are reviewed and critiqued in detail in Carruthers (2008a), who 
demonstrates that all of the phenomena in question are readily explicable in first-order terms. 
Here I shall confine myself to outlining my treatment of just one of the simpler alleged instances 
of animal metacognition. 
 
Smith et al. (2003) argue that the adaptive behavioral choices made by monkeys and dolphins in 
conditions of uncertainty demonstrate that the animals are aware of their own state of uncertainty 
and are choosing accordingly. Thus monkeys who have been trained to discriminate between 
dense and sparse visual patterns, and to respond differentially as a result, will increasingly make 
use of a third “don’t know” option (which advances them to a new trial without the penalty of a 
delay) when the patterns are made harder and harder to distinguish. But all that is really needed 
to explain the animals’ behavior here is an appeal to degrees of belief and desire. For an animal 
that has a weak degree of belief that the pattern is dense and an equally weak degree of belief 
that the pattern is sparse will have correspondingly weak and balancing desires to make the 
“dense” response as well as to make the “sparse” response. In contrast, the animal will have a 
high degree of belief that the “don’t know” response will advance to a new trial without a 
timeout, and a timeout is something that the animal wants to avoid. Hence pressing the “don’t 
know” key will be the strongest-motivated action in the circumstances. No metacognitive forms 
of awareness of the animal’s own mental states are required. 
 
Of course humans, when they have performed tasks of this sort, will report that they were aware 
of a feeling of uncertainty, and will say that they chose as they did because they were uncertain.  
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There is no problem here. Although these reports are metacognitive, and reflect metacognitive 
awareness, the processes reported on can be first-order ones, just as they are for the monkeys. In 
both species uncertainty will be accompanied by feelings of anxiety, which will motivate various 
forms of information-seeking behavior (such as moving one’s head from side to side for a better 
view), as well as a search for alternatives. But humans, with their highly-developed mindreading 
capacities, will interpret these feelings and resulting behaviors for what they are—manifestations 
of uncertainty. It is only if a human reports that she acted as she did, not just because she was 
uncertain, but because she was aware of being uncertain, that there will be any conflict. Such 
reports are likely to be false, in my view. For the most part the “executive function” behaviors 
that we share with other animals are best explained in terms of the first-order processes that we 
also share (Carruthers, 2008a). It is only when we consider forms of behavior that are unique to 
humans that we need to appeal to metacognitive processes.
7 But these can all be processes that I 
shall describe in Section 7 as belonging to “System 2”, which don’t require any faculty of 
introspection distinct from mindreading. 
 
6.  The confabulation data 
 
There is extensive and long-standing evidence from cognitive and social psychology that people 
will (falsely) confabulate attributions of judgments and decisions to themselves in a wide range 
of circumstances, while being under the impression that they are introspecting (Festinger, 1957; 
Bem, 1967, 1972; Wicklund and Brehm, 1976; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002). These data are consistent with a “dual method” account of 
metacognition (Goldman, 2006), according to which metacognition is sometimes self-
interpretative and sometimes introspective. But given that we have been offered, as yet, no 
positive reasons to believe in the reality of introspection for attitudes, the best explanation at this 
stage will be that metacognition always results from people turning their mindreading abilities 
upon themselves. 
 
Literally hundreds of different studies have been conducted charting confabulation effects and 
the circumstances under which they occur; and a number of different explanatory frameworks 
have been proposed (“cognitive dissonance”, “self-perception”, and others). I have space only to 
describe a few salient examples and to discuss some of the ways in which an introspection-
theorist might attempt to respond. 
 
First, however, let me mention some types of confabulation data that aren’t relevant for our 
                                                 
7 This isn’t quite accurate. For to the extent that apes, for example, do have limited mindreading abilities (e.g. in 
respect of perception and goal-directed action), to that extent one might expect to find metacognitive processes 
also. At any rate, this is what a “mindreading is prior” account would predict.  
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purposes. One emerges from studies that find people to be inaccurate in reporting the causes of 
their judgments or behavior. For example, people are notoriously bad at identifying the factors 
that persuade them of the truth of a message or the quality of a job interviewee. Such cases raise 
no difficulty for a believer in introspection. The reason is simple: no one thinks that causation 
can be introspected. It is supposed to be the occurrence of our attitudes that is accessible to 
introspection, not the causal role (if any) that those attitudes have in any given situation. This 
could only be known by theorizing. Likewise, we should set to one side studies in which subjects 
are required to report on their attitudes some significant time afterwards. Thus the fact that 
subjects will, at the end of the experiment, confabulate lesser enjoyment in playing with a game 
when they had been paid to play with it (belied by the amount of time that they had freely 
devoted to the game in their spare time; Kruglanski et al., 1972) raises no difficulty for an 
introspection-theorist. For given the proposed on-line monitoring function for introspection, it 
makes sense that no medium or long-term record of introspected mental events should normally 
be kept. And in the absence of any such record, subjects will have no option but to self-interpret. 
(The cognitive monitoring account must require that brief records of introspected events should 
be kept in some sort of working memory system, however. So we should expect subjects to be 
capable of giving introspective reports for a few moments after the events have occurred. This 
point is relevant to a number of the experiments described below.) 
 
Now consider one of the classic studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). Subjects chose 
between four items of panty-hose (which were actually identical), thinking that they were taking 
part in a market survey. They displayed a strong right-hand bias in their choices, but all offered 
judgments of quality (“I thought that pair was the softest” etc.) immediately afterwards in 
explanation of their choice. Nisbett and Wilson themselves cast this result in terms of 
confabulation about the causes of action, and those who believe in the introspectability of 
judgments will often dismiss it on that ground (Rey, 2008). But this is to miss the point that 
subjects are also confabulating and attributing to themselves a judgment (albeit one that they 
believe to have caused their action, and at least on the assumption that they didn’t actually judge 
the right-hand item to be softest—otherwise the first-order mechanisms discussed in Section 2.1 
could underlie their reports). How could one claim otherwise? Well, it is likely that the root 
cause of the right-hand choice bias is a right-hand attention bias, and someone might claim that 
attending more to the right-hand items causes subjects to judge that those items are softer (or are 
of better quality, or a nicer color, etc.). These judgments can then be introspected and veridically 
reported. But the causal pathways postulated here are pretty mysterious. And the most likely 
candidates for fleshing them out are ones that already involve confabulation. (For example, 
noticing that I am attending more to the right-hand item, and noticing that it is soft, my 
mindreading faculty might hypothesize that I am paying it more attention to it because it is the 
softest, leading me to ascribe to myself just such a judgment.) 
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There is also ample evidence of confabulation for decisions. For example, Brasil-Neto et al. 
(1992) caused subjects to move one index finger or another via focal magnetic stimulation of 
areas of motor cortex in the relevant brain hemisphere. (Subjects had been instructed to freely 
decide which finger to move when they heard a click, which was actually the sound of the 
magnet being turned on.) Yet the subjects themselves reported deciding to move that finger. 
Now, it is very unlikely that stimulation of motor cortex should itself cause a decision (as well as 
causing movement), hence giving rise to a propositional attitude event that can be introspected. 
For if the back-projecting pathways between motor cortex and frontal cortex were used for this 
purpose, then one would predict that stimulation of pre-motor cortex would also have such an 
effect; but it doesn’t (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992). 
 
Further evidence of confabulation for decisions is provided by Wegner and Wheatley (1999), 
who induced in subjects the belief that they had just previously taken a decision to stop a moving 
cursor on a screen (which was controlled via a computer mouse operated jointly with a 
confederate of the experimenter) by the simple expedient of evoking a semantically-relevant idea 
in the subject just prior to the time when the confederate actually caused the cursor to stop. 
(Subjects heard a word through headphones—ostensibly as a distracter—shortly before the 
confederate was able to bring the cursor to a stop beside a picture of the named object.) It seems 
that the subject’s mindreading faculty, presented with the evidence that the subject had been 
thinking of the relevant object shortly before the cursor came to a stop beside it, reasoned to the 
most likely explanation, and concluded that the subject had taken a decision to stop beside that 
very object. (A control condition ruled out the possibility that hearing the semantically-relevant 
word caused an actual decision to stop the cursor next to the named object.) 
 
It might be objected that all of the examples considered so far are ones where (plausibly) there 
was actually no judgment made, or no decision taken, although behavior occurred that led 
subjects to think that it had. Hence someone might propose that it is only in such cases that 
confabulation occurs. Whenever there is a propositional attitude event, it might be said, it can be 
introspected; and only when there isn’t will subjects self-interpret. However, if there really were 
two distinct ways of attributing judgments and decisions to oneself (an introspective mode as 
well as an interpretative one), then it would be odd that the latter should always win out in cases 
where no judgment or decision has actually been made. For presumably an introspective 
mechanism can detect an absence. And if the introspective mechanism is delivering the 
judgment, “No judgment” or, “No decision” at the same time as the mindreading system is 
attributing one to oneself, then why is it that the latter should always dominate, leading to 
confabulated answers to the experimenters’ questions? On the contrary, since the introspective 
mechanism is supposed to have evolved to be especially direct and reliable, one would expect it 
to be routinely given precedence in cases of conflict. 
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Consider some further data: subjects who emerge from an hypnotic trance, and then later carry 
out an instruction given to them while hypnotized, will often confabulate an explanation for their 
action (Wegner, 2002). Presumably what happens is that they decide, while hypnotized, to 
comply with the request of the hypnotist. And the effect of this decision is to set up a conditional 
intention—e.g., “When I see the book on the table I shall place it on the shelf”—which remains 
in existence once the hypnotic episode and original decision are forgotten. This intention is then 
activated thereafter when the antecedent of the intention is fulfilled (e.g., the book is seen). In 
which case, there is a decision here to report. And if the subject were to confine herself to 
reporting just that decision (e.g., to put the book on the shelf), then she would report veridically. 
But in fact she confabulates a further judgment and/or goal—e.g., that the book is out of place 
and makes the room look untidy. 
 
It might be said in reply that placing a book on a shelf isn’t something that people normally do 
for its own sake. Hence there are powerful pragmatic reasons for the agent to confabulate a 
further attitude when pressed by the experimenter to explain her action, even given that the 
introspective mechanism is detecting the absence of any such state (Rey, 2008). But this 
explanation is problematic. For there are all sorts of circumstances in which people are perfectly 
content to say, “I don’t know why; I just did it” when asked to explain why they acted in a 
particular way. Why should the same not be true here? Indeed, it isn’t uncommon to catch 
oneself performing actions of precisely this sort—absent-mindedly moving a household item 
from one place to another—in circumstances where one is prompted to ask oneself, “Why did I 
just do that?”, or where one replies if challenged for an explanation, “I don’t know; just a 
nervous tic I suppose.” But in any case Rey’s suggestion should be testable: the hypnotist could 
instruct a subject to perform a movement that is ambiguous between two distinct actions (e.g. 
greeting someone with a wave versus waving away a bug), one of which is very much more 
likely in the circumstances (e.g. indoors, occurring just as someone known to the subject enters 
the room). The hypnotist’s instruction would be formulated in terms of the less likely action. 
(“When John enters the room you will raise your arm and move it back and forth with the palm 
facing forwards to shift away any bugs.”) On Rey’s introspective account, subjects should offer 
the latter in explanation of their arm-movement. A “mindreading is prior” theorist will predict, in 
contrast, that subjects should offer the more likely explanation (“I was waving to John.”) 
 
There is also an extensive and long-standing set of data that subjects’ behavior, when caused in 
ways that they are unaware of or inattentive to, will lead them to confabulate when describing 
their own degree of belief in some proposition. (See Festinger, 1957; Bem, 1967, 1972; Cooper 
and Duncan, 1971; Greenbaum et al., 1972; Wicklund and Brehm, 1976. For a more recent 
review, see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.) Thus subjects who are manipulated into writing a 
counter-attitudinal essay for meager pay, but believing that they have made a free decision, will 
say that they have a greater degree of belief in the proposition that their essay was defending  
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than will subjects in the same circumstances who are paid a decent sum of money. It seems that 
subjects reason: “I’m wrote the essay freely, but I can’t have done it for the money, so I must 
believe it.” And indeed, subjects who don’t participate but have the circumstances of the various 
essay-writers described to them make just such an inference. 
 
Likewise, it has long been known that subjects who are induced to nod their heads while 
listening to a tape via headphones (ostensibly to test the headphones themselves) will say that 
they have a greater degree of belief in the propositions being defended on the tape than will 
subjects who are induced to shake their heads (Wells and Petty, 1980). It seems that subjects 
reason: “Since I am nodding / shaking my head, this is evidence that I believe / disbelieve the 
propositions asserted.” Admittedly, this isn’t the only explanation possible. It might be that head-
nodding primes for positive thoughts about the message, which in turn cause greater agreement, 
which is then veridically reported. Briñol and Petty (2003) set out to test this alternative by 
varying the persuasiveness of the messages themselves. When the message is persuasive, 
nodding increases belief and head-shaking decreases it, which is consistent with either one of the 
two explanations. But when the message is unpersuasive the opposite occurs: nodding decreases 
belief and head-shaking increases it. The authors present evidence that what is actually 
happening is that subjects interpret their own nodding behavior as confirming their own initial 
negative reactions to the message, while head-shaking is interpreted as disagreement with those 
reactions. 
 
Now, it doesn’t follow, logically, from all this (and much more) data that there is no such thing 
as introspection for propositional attitudes. For there might be one set of such events to which we 
have introspective access while there is another set that we can’t introspect; and hence whenever 
our behavior is caused by attitudes drawn from the latter set, we are forced to self-interpret (and 
often to confabulate). What might be proposed, in effect, is that there is both a conscious and an 
unconscious mind. Judgments and decisions within the conscious mind are introspectable, 
whereas judgments and decisions within the unconscious mind can only be known (if at all) by 
turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. And just such a view seems to be endorsed 
by some of those who have been most prolific in demonstrating the reality of metacognitive 
attitude attribution via processes of interpretation and confabulation. Thus both Wegner (2002) 
and Wilson (2002) allow that we do sometimes have introspective access to our (conscious) 
thoughts, even if much of the time our access to our own propositional attitudes is interpretative, 
and often confabulatory. 
 
In order for this proposal to count as a realistic competitor to the interpretation-only alternative, 
however, we need some principled account of the two forms of mentality and their relationships 
to each other. This isn’t by any means an easy thing to provide. For we need to know what it is 
about some judgments and decisions that makes them available for introspection, while others  
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are cut off from such availability. What kind of cognitive architecture can underlie and explain 
these patterns of availability and unavailability in anything more than an ad hoc way? This 
challenge will be taken up in the next section, where the only such account that I know of will be 
outlined and discussed. It will turn out on closer investigation, however, that the account actually 
lends no support to the introspectionist position. 
 
7.  Is there a conscious mind? 
 
One possible response to our challenge is to distinguish between two different levels of mental 
process (conscious and unconscious). And the only worked-out account of these two levels that I 
know of is as follows. It would be allowed that the access that we have to our unconscious 
attitudes (whether or not they get expressed in speech or other imagery) is always interpretative, 
as argued above. But it might be claimed that the stream of inner speech and other forms of 
imagery is constitutive of a distinct kind of (conscious) mentality (Frankish, 2004). Certainly 
such events aren’t epiphenomenal, but often make an important causal contribution to 
subsequent thought and behavior (Clark, 1998; Carruthers, 2002, 2006). And it might be said that 
such events are routinely available to introspection. 
 
This suggestion comports very naturally with an idea that has been gaining increasing ground 
amongst those who work on the psychology of reasoning (Evans and Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996, 
2002; Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman, 2002). This is that human reasoning processes may be 
divided into two very different types, often now referred to as “System 1” and “System 2”. 
System 1 (which is really a set of systems, arranged in parallel) is fast, unconscious, hard to alter, 
universal to all thinkers, and evolutionarily ancient. System 2, in contrast, is slow and serial, 
characteristically conscious, malleable in its principles of operation, admits of significant 
variations between individuals, and is evolutionarily novel. And a number of authors have 
emphasized the important constitutive role played by imagery (especially inner speech) in the 
operations of System 2 (Evans and Over, 1996; Frankish, 2004; Carruthers, 2009). Likewise, 
others have demonstrated the crucial role played by inner speech in the performance of tests of 
executive functioning (which are likely to implicate System 2), such as the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting task (Baddeley et al., 2001). For when inner speech is suppressed by the need to shadow 
an irrelevant speech stream while performing the task, performance collapses. 
 
In order for this account to be successful, however, it is obviously crucial that the conscious 
imagistic events in question should play the right sorts of causal role, constitutive of the roles of 
the various attitude types. Not any-old causal role will do. Thus it is a conceptual constraint on 
an event being an instance of deciding, for example, that it should fit one of two causal profiles 
(Bratman, 1987, 1999). In the case of a decision to act here-and-now, the decision should issue in 
motor instructions without the intervention of any further practical reasoning. A decision is  
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supposed to end the process of practical reasoning and to settle what I do (unless something goes 
awry with my motor system, of course). Something similar is true of a decision to act in the 
future: this should settle that I act (unless something significant changes in the interim) and what 
act I shall perform. Any further reasoning in the future should be confined to the question of how 
to act. Intentions for the future place constraints on our practical reasoning. They have the form 
of partial plans, in which details may be left blank to be filled in later, but in which the overall 
structure is fixed. 
 
A similar point can be made about judgments. Just as a decision is an event that ends a process of 
practical (action-oriented) reasoning, so a (non-perceptual) judgment is an event that concludes a 
piece of theoretical (belief-oriented) reasoning. A judgment, then, is an event that will normally 
(a) immediately (without further inference) give rise to a stored standing-state belief with the 
same content, and (b) will immediately be available to inform practical reasoning, interacting 
with the subject’s goals (where appropriate) in the construction of plans. If an event is genuinely 
a judgment, then there should be no further cognitive activity standing between it and the normal 
roles of judgment (the formation of belief and the guidance of action).  
 
We need to ask, therefore, in what way it is that the events that constitute System 2 achieve their 
characteristic effects. For only if they have the right sorts of causal roles can they be said to be 
propositional attitude events of judging, deciding, and the like. And so only if they have the right 
sorts of roles can our introspective, non-interpretative, awareness of them (which I grant) 
constitute introspective, non-interpretative, awareness of a set of propositional attitudes. 
 
The processes that take place in System 2 don’t simply mirror those that take place in System 1, 
of course, tracking them one-for-one. Rather, sequences of imagery can occur in accordance with 
well-practiced rules or habits, or they can be guided by subjects’ beliefs about how they should 
reason, often issuing in an assertoric statement, for example, that isn’t simply the expression of a 
pre-existing (System 1) judgment.
8 So let us consider such a case. As a result of an episode of 
System 2 conscious activity, I might formulate and rehearse the assertoric utterance, “Polar bears 
are endangered.” Under interpretation, this event will likely be heard as an assertion that polar 
bears are endangered. And as a result, I shall think and act in the future much as if I had formed 
just such a judgment. I shall, for example, reply positively if asked whether or not polar bears are 
endangered. And if one of my goals is to try to protect endangered species, then I might, in 
consequence of this event, begin writing a suitable letter to my congressional representative. 
 
                                                 
8 Sometimes a System 2 utterance does express an underlying System 1 judgment with the same content, no doubt. 
But in such a case it is all the clearer that the utterance in question isn’t itself a judgment. Nor does the 
expressibility of judgments in speech provide any reason for believing in introspection, as we saw in Section 2.1.  
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How does the rehearsed assertion achieve these effects? There are a number of possibilities. 
(These aren’t mutually exclusive, I should stress. On the contrary, a pluralist position concerning 
the realization of System 2 processes is probably correct; see Carruthers, 2009.) One is that the 
event causes me to believe of myself (unconsciously, at the System 1 level) that I believe polar 
bears to be endangered. Then this, together with a standing desire to think and act consistently, 
will lead me to answer positively when asked whether or not I believe that polar bears are 
endangered. And it might also issue in letter-writing behavior. For if I believe myself to believe 
that polar bears are endangered, and want to do something to help endangered species, then 
consistency requires that I should act.  
 
Another possibility is that my mentally rehearsed assertion causes me to believe that I have 
committed myself to the truth of the proposition that polar bears are endangered. And then a 
standing (System 1) desire to execute my commitments will lead me to act in ways that I 
consider to be appropriate to that commitment. And yet another possibility is that the rehearsed 
sentence is treated by my cognitive systems much as if it were an item of testimony from a 
putatively reliable informant, and after checking for coherence with existing belief it is then 
stored as a first-order (System 1) belief, which then issues in appropriate behavior in the normal 
way. 
 
The important point to notice is that on each of these three accounts, the rehearsal of the 
assertion, “Polar bears are endangered” does not give rise to a standing-state belief immediately, 
without the mediation of any further cognitive processing. Nor is it immediately available to 
guide planning with respect to endangered species. For in each case further, down-stream, 
cognitive activity must occur first. Either I must form the belief that I believe polar bears to be 
endangered, which then interacts with a higher-order desire to guide activity consistent with my 
possessing such a belief. Or I must form the belief that I have made an appropriate commitment, 
which again has to interact with a higher-order desire to execute my commitments in order to 
guide behavior. Or the assertion must be evaluated in something like the way that the testimony 
of other people is (checking for coherence with existing belief, and so on—see Harris, 2002a, 
2002b, who shows that even young children don’t automatically accept the testimony of others, 
but evaluate it in light of a variety of “gate-keeping” criteria first). In each of these cases the 
relevant assertion does not have the right sort of causal role to be a judgment. For it doesn’t by 
itself settle what I believe. 
 
An exactly parallel argument can be constructed for System 2 episodes that might be candidate 
decisions, such as saying to myself (in inner speech) at the conclusion of a period of System 2 
activity, “So, I shall write to my congressman.” This utterance doesn’t, by itself, settle anything. 
For it first has to give rise to the belief that I have decided to write, or to the belief that I have 
committed myself to write, and then the causal pathways operate as above. So in each case, then,  
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although there is a conscious System 2 event to which I have introspective access, it isn’t an 
event of deciding on an action, or of forming a new judgment. And this argument generalizes to 
other candidate types of propositional attitude, such as supposing something to be the case, or 
fearing that something is the case, and so forth. 
 
(Interestingly, however, System 2 conscious activity is constitutive of thinking. For there are few 
significant conceptual constraints on what sorts of processes can count as thinking. Roughly 
speaking, any sequence of content-bearing events that makes some difference to subsequent 
attitude-formation or to behavior can count as thinking. So we do have introspective access to 
some forms of thinking—specifically to imagistically expressed System 2 thinking—even if, as I 
have argued, we don’t have such access to any propositional attitudes.) 
 
I conclude that there is, indeed, such a thing as conscious mentality. In addition to globally 
broadcast experiences of various sorts, there are also sequences of visual and auditory imagery 
that make an important difference to our cognitive and practical lives. But our introspective 
access to these events doesn’t thereby give us introspective access to any propositional attitudes. 
On the contrary, our only form of access to propositional attitudes of judging, deciding, and so 
forth is interpretative.  
 
8.  The evidence of unsymbolized thinking 
 
Recall from Section 1 that a “mindreading is prior” account makes two distinctive predictions. 
The first is that it should be possible for subjects to be misled, in attributing propositional 
attitudes to themselves, by being presented with manipulated behavioral or sensory data. As we 
have seen in Sections 6 and 7, this prediction is amply confirmed, in ways that the opposed 
accounts cannot easily accommodate. But the second prediction is that subjects should be 
incapable of attributing propositional attitudes to themselves in the absence of behavioral or 
sensory data. All three of the opposing positions, in contrast, make the opposite prediction. Since 
they maintain that introspection for propositional attitudes exists, subjects should generally have 
no need of evidence of any kind when making self-attributions. The presence of behavioral and 
sensory cues should be entirely accidental. However, we have already seen in Section 5.1 that 
many kinds of metacognitive judgment—such as judgments of learning—are actually dependent 
upon sensory cues. Hence in these cases, at least, the sensory cues aren’t accidental. The present 
section will evaluate some additional evidence that bears on this matter. 
 
The data in question derive from “introspection sampling” studies conducted with normal 
subjects, using the methodology devised by Hurlburt (1990, 1993). Subjects wear a paging 
device throughout the day, via which they hear a “beep” at randomly generated intervals. 
Subjects are instructed to “freeze” the contents of their consciousness at the very moment of the  
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beep, and to make notes of it, to be discussed and elaborated in a later meeting with the 
experimenter. All normal subjects report, in varying proportions, the occurrence of inner speech, 
visual imagery, and emotional feelings. But many subjects also report the presence of “purely 
propositional”, unsymbolized, thoughts at the moment of the beep. In these cases subjects report 
thinking something highly determinate—such as wondering whether or not to buy a given box of 
breakfast cereal—in the absence of any visual imagery, inner speech, or other sensory 
accompaniments. 
 
So far there isn’t any difficulty, here, for a “mindreading is prior” account. For such an account 
doesn’t have to claim that all thinking should be imagistically expressed. Indeed, quite the 
contrary: the thoughts generated by the mindreading system itself will characteristically remain 
unexpressed. What the account does claim is that self-attributions of thought should be 
dependent on the presence of either sensory / imagistic or behavioral / circumstantial data. And 
what is striking about a good many of the instances of self-attributed unsymbolized thought is 
that they occur in circumstances in which a third-party observer might have made precisely the 
same attribution. If you saw someone standing motionless, looking reflectively at a box of 
breakfast cereal on a supermarket shelf, for example, then you might well predict that she is 
wondering whether or not to buy it. Our suggestion can therefore be that when prompted by the 
beep, subjects turn their mindreading systems on their own behavior and circumstances (together 
with any sensory or imagistic cues that might be present), often enough interpreting themselves 
as entertaining a specific thought. Provided that the process happens swiftly, this will then be 
self-attributed with all of the phenomenological immediacy and introspective obviousness as 
normal. 
 
While a great many of the examples in the literature can be handled in this way, not quite all of 
them can. For instance, at the time of the beep one subject reported that she was wondering 
whether her friend who would be picking her up later that day would be driving his car or his 
truck. This thought seemed to occur in the absence of any inner speech or visual imagery. Yet 
there was nothing in the subject’s immediate circumstances or behavior from which it could be 
derived, either. What cannot be ruled out, however, is that the thought in question was self-
attributed because it made the best sense of sensory activity that had been taking place just prior 
to the beep—for example, two memory images deriving from previous experience, in one of 
which the friend arrives in his car and in the other of which he arrives in his pickup truck. Since 
Hurlburt’s methodology makes no provision for collecting data on experiences occurring shortly 
prior to the beep, we simply don’t know. An extension of the methodology might provide us with 
a valuable test, however. Another possible test would be to look for correlations between the 
extent to which different subjects report purely propositional thoughts (with quantities of inner 
speech and visual imagery controlled for) and the speed of their mindreading abilities in third-
person tasks. Since subjects will only have the illusion of introspecting if they can reach a self- 
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interpretation smoothly and swiftly, I predict that there should be a positive correlation. 
 
Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) concede that it is possible that attributions of unsymbolized thought 
to oneself might result from swift and unconscious self-interpretation. But they present the 
following consideration against such a possibility. Subjects are initially quite reluctant and 
hesitant in describing instances of unsymbolized thought, presumably because they share the 
commonly held folk theory that all conscious thinking is accompanied by images of one sort or 
another. But explicitly held folk theories are one thing, assumptions built into the operations of 
the mindreading faculty are quite another. And there is no reason to think that the latter will 
share all of the culturally-developed assumptions made by the folk. Hence the mindreading 
system might have no hesitation in attributing a thought to the self in the absence of any sensory 
cues, even though the person in whom that system resides does so hesitate. I conclude this 
section, therefore, with the claim that although there is no support to be derived for a 
“mindreading is prior” account from the introspection-sampling data, neither is there, as yet, any 
evidence to count against it. 
 
9.  The evidence from schizophrenia 
 
Recall from Section 1 that two of the three competitor models (namely #1 and #2) predict that 
there should exist cases in which mindreading is intact while metacognition is damaged. The 
“mindreading is prior” account, in contrast, must deny this. Nichols and Stich (2003) cite certain 
forms of schizophrenia as confirming the former prediction. More specifically, patients with 
“passivity” symptoms, who claim that their own actions aren’t under their control and that their 
own episodes of inner speech are somehow inserted into their minds by other people, are 
supposed to demonstrate such a dissociation (presumably on the grounds that such patients no 
longer have normal introspective access to their own behavioral intentions).
9, 10 For such patients 
perform normally when tested on batteries of mindreading tasks. 
 
There is no reason to think that the symptoms of passivity forms of schizophrenia are best 
explained by a failure of metacognitive competence, however. Rather, the damage lies 
                                                 
9 Similar claims are made by Bayne and Pacherie (2007). They argue against an interpretative account of self-
awareness of the sort defended here, preferring what they call a “comparator-based” account. But I think that they 
mis-characterize the models of normal action-monitoring that they discuss. Properly understood, those models lend 
no support for the claim that metacognition is damaged in schizophrenia. See the paragraphs that follow.  
10 The claim that we have introspective access to our own motor intentions seems also to underlie the idea that 
“mirror neurons” might play an important role in the development of mindreading (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). 
For what would be the use, for purposes of social understanding, of an activation of one’s own motor system in 
response to an observation of the action of another, unless one could acquire metacognitive access to the motor 
plan in question? (For a variety of criticisms of this account of the mirror neuron system, see Csibra, 2007, and 
Southgate et al., 2008.)  
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elsewhere, resulting in faulty data being presented to the mindreading system. Frith et al. (2000a, 
2000b) provide a detailed account that is designed to explain a range of disorders of action and 
awareness of action (including passivity-symptom schizophrenia). The account builds on well 
established models of normal action control, according to which an “efference copy” of each set 
of motor instructions is transformed via one or more body emulator systems and used to 
construct a “forward model” of the expected sensory consequences of the movement. This can 
then be compared, both with the motor-intention itself and with the incoming perceptual data, 
allowing for swift correction of the action as it unfolds (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Wolpert and 
Ghahramani, 2000; Grush, 2004). Frith et al. think that the symptoms of passivity and “alien 
control” in schizophrenia can be explained as issuing from damage to this action-monitoring 
system, which results in no forward model ever being created for comparison. 
 
Now the important point to note for our purposes is that the kind of action-monitoring described 
above is entirely first-order in character, and qualifies as “metacognitive” only in the weak and 
irrelevant sense distinguished in Section 5.1. There is no reason to think that it should involve 
metarepresentions of our own motor intentions, let alone introspective access to them. And 
indeed, the speed with which the monitoring process operates suggests very strongly that 
introspection isn’t involved (Jeannerod, 2006). 
 
But why should the absence of a forward model lead subjects to feel that their actions aren’t their 
own? Frith et al. (2000a) point out that the forward model is normally used to “damp down” 
experiences resulting from movement that are of the sort predicted in the forward model. This is 
why it is normally impossible to tickle yourself, whereas if you wear special gloves that 
introduce a slight delay in your movements, then self-tickling suddenly becomes possible 
(Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Blakemore et al., 1998). And it is also why when you unwrap a candy 
at the opera you barely hear it while those around you are disturbed. If no forward model is 
created, however, then perceptions resulting from your actions will be experienced with full 
vividness, just as if the movements had been caused by another person. The suggestion is that 
passivity-symptom schizophrenics have the sense that their actions are caused by others because 
those actions literally feel to them that way. 
 
In addition, one might expect the comparator process to give rise to heightened attention and 
feelings of anxiety in cases where there is too great a mismatch between the forward model and 
the perceptual data received. These feelings would be especially enhanced in cases where there is 
no forward model, as a result of some pathology. For the comparator system would be receiving 
perceptual input of an action being performed, but without receiving the normally attendant input 
deriving from an efference copy of a motor intention. So this would, as it were, be a case of 
maximum mismatch. An additional suggestion, then, is that these feelings of anxiety might 
signal to the mindreading system that something is amiss, perhaps reinforcing the impression that  
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the actions aren’t one’s own. Put differently: only when everything is going smoothly, with no 
feelings of anxiety or surprise specifically attending one’s action, does the mindreading system 
attribute agency to the self by default. 
 
I conclude that passivity-symptom forms of schizophrenia aren’t best interpreted as instances of 
a dissociation between mindreading and metacognitive capacities. Rather than being cases in 
which mindreading is intact while introspection is damaged, the damage is to lower-level 
forward-modeling and/or comparator systems. This results in experiences that are naturally 
interpreted as indicating that one’s actions (including one’s mental actions, such as inner speech) 
aren’t one’s own. 
 
10.  The evidence from autism 
 
The final major area in which the relationship between mindreading and metacognition can be 
assessed concerns autism. Almost everyone agrees that third-person mindreading is significantly 
impaired in autism. (There is, however, disagreement over whether this impairment lies at the 
heart of the syndrome.) In which case the prediction of a “mindreading is prior” account will be 
that autistic people’s access to their own propositional attitude states must be impaired as well. 
Nichols and Stich (2003) and Goldman (2006) each maintain, in contrast, that introspection is 
intact in autism, with difficulties in other-understanding arising from difficulties in supposing or 
empathizing. 
 
One set of data concerns an introspection sampling study conducted with three adult autistic men 
(Hurlburt et al., 1994; Frith and Happé, 1999). All three were able to report on what was passing 
through their minds at the time of a randomly generated “beep”, although one of them 
experienced significant difficulties with the task. This is interpreted as demonstrating that 
introspection is intact in autism. There are two points to make. First, none of these three subjects 
was entirely deficient at mindreading. On the contrary, two of them could pass second-level 
false-belief tasks, and the third could pass simple first-level false-belief tasks. So no one should 
predict that any of them would be entirely deficient at self-attribution, either. (It is worth noting, 
moreover, that the experimenters found a strong correlation between the subjects’ abilities with 
third-person tasks and the sophistication and ease of their introspective reports. This finding is 
problematic for the view that introspection is undamaged in autism.) Second, the form of 
“mindreading is prior” account being defended here predicts that autistic people should have no 
difficulty in reporting the occurrence of perceptions, images, or emotional feelings, provided that 
they possess the requisite concepts. For these events will be globally broadcast and made directly 
accessible to their (damaged but partially functioning) mindreading faculties. And indeed, much 
of the content of the introspective reports of the three autistic subjects concerned visual imagery 
and emotional feelings. Reports of their own occurrent attitudes tended to be generic (“I was  
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thinking …”), and one of the three men (the one who could only pass first-level false-belief 
tasks) had significant difficulties in reporting his own attitudes at all.  
 
Another set of data of the same general sort concerns the autobiographical reports of autistic 
adults, who are often able to describe with some vividness what their mental lives were like at 
ages when they almost certainly wouldn’t have been capable of attributing mental states to other 
people. Nichols and Stich (2003) comment that (provided we accept the memory reports as 
accurate), the individuals in question must have had reliable introspective access to their own 
mental states prior to having any capacity for mindreading. But actually we have no reason at all 
to believe that memory is itself a second-order (metarepresentational) process. When I observe 
an event, a first-order representation of that event may be stored in memory. When that memory 
is later activated, I shall describe it by saying that I remember seeing the event in question (say). 
But it doesn’t at all follow that the original event involved any metarepresentation of myself as 
seeing something. Likewise for other sorts of memories, and other sorts of mental events. The 
fact that autistic adults give metarepresentational reports of their mental lives as children doesn’t 
show that autistic children are capable of metarepresenting their own mental states. It just shows 
that they are capable of memory formation. 
 
Nichols and Stich (2003) also place considerable reliance on a study by Farrant et al. (1999), 
who tested autistic children, as well as learning-disabled and normal children matched for verbal 
mental age, on a range of metamemory tasks. Since they were able to find no significant 
differences between the groups, the authors conclude that metacognition is unimpaired in autism. 
Two preliminary points should be emphasized about this study, however. One is that almost all 
of the autistic children tested were sufficiently well advanced to be able to pass first-order false-
belief tasks. So we should predict that they would have some understanding of their own minds, 
and that they would be capable of completing simple metacognitive tasks. Another point is 
methodological: the small group sizes meant that statistically-significant differences weren’t 
detected even when a trend (namely weaker performance by the autistic children) was plainly 
visible in the raw data. We simply don’t know whether those trends would have been significant 
had larger groups of children been used. 
 
A deeper problem with the Farrant et al. data is that none of the experimental tasks was 
metacognitive in the right sort of way, requiring access to the subject’s current propositional 
attitudes. On the contrary, they could be solved by anyone who possessed the requisite mental 
concepts who was also a smart behaviorist. For example, one experiment tested whether autistic 
children were aware that it is easier to learn a small number of items than a larger number. Not 
surprisingly, the children did well on this test. But they would have had ample opportunity over a 
number of years of schooling to have established a reliable correlation between the number of 
items studied in a task and the number of responses later given that are evaluated as correct.  
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(Note that the average age of the autistic children in this experiment was eleven years.) 
 
It is true that many of the autistic children in question could give simple verbal descriptions of 
some memorization strategies. But many of these involved such things as looking in likely places 
(for an object that had been mislaid) or listening carefully to the instructions (from someone 
reciting a list of things to remember). This is metacognitive only in the minimal sense of 
mentioning looking and listening. Moreover, in order to develop a cognitive strategy like mental 
rehearsal (which a number of the autistic as well as normal subjects suggested), it is doubtful that 
much mindreading ability is required. Rather, children just need to notice a positive correlation 
between a behavior (rehearsal) and an outcome (getting the correct answer), which should be 
well within the reach of even a clever behaviorist (provided that the latter had access also to 
inner behavior, such as inner speech). 
 
The data from autistic people considered by Nichols and Stich (2003) and by Goldman (2006) 
don’t support their introspectionist positions against an interpretative, “mindreading is prior”, 
account, then. But there are other data that these authors don’t discuss, which suggest that 
autistic people are decidedly poor at attributing propositional attitudes to themselves. Let me 
describe just a couple of strands of evidence here.  
 
Phillips et al. (1998) tested autistic children against learning-impaired controls (matched for 
verbal mental age) on an intention reporting task. The children had to shoot a “ray gun” at some 
canisters in the hopes of obtaining the prizes contained within some of them. But the actual 
outcome (i.e. which canister fell down) was surreptitiously manipulated by the experimenters (in 
a way that even adults playing the game couldn’t detect). They were asked to select and 
announce which canister they were aiming at in advance (e.g. “The red one”), and the 
experimenter then placed a token of the same color next to the gun to help them remember. After 
learning whether they had obtained a prize, the children were asked, “Did you mean to hit that 
[e.g.] green one, or did you mean to hit the other [e.g.] red one?” The autistic children were 
much poorer than the controls at correctly identifying what they had intended to do in conditions 
where there was a discrepancy between intention and goal satisfaction. For example, if they 
didn’t “hit” the one they aimed at, but still got a prize, they were much more likely to say that the 
canister that fell was the one that they had meant to hit.
11 
 
Likewise Kazak et al. (1997) presented autistic children with trials on which either they, or a 
third party, were allowed to look inside a box, or were not allowed to look inside a box. They 
                                                 
11 Russell and Hill (2001), however, were unable to replicate these results. This is probably because their population 
of autistic children, although of lower average age, had higher average verbal IQs, suggesting that their autism was 
much less severe. Since most researchers think that intention-reading is amongst the easiest of mindreading tasks, 
one might predict that only very young or more severely disabled autistic individuals would be likely to fail at it.  
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were then asked whether they or the third party knew what was in the box, or were just guessing. 
The autistic children got many more of these questions wrong than did control groups. And 
importantly for our purposes, there was no advantage for answers to questions about the child’s 
own knowledge over answers to questions about the knowledge of the third party. This result is 
especially striking since the children could have answered the self-knowledge version of the 
question merely by asking themselves the first-order question, “What is in the box?”, without 
needing to engage in metacognitive processes at all (except when transforming the result into a 
metacognitive answer to the experimenter’s question). 
 
I conclude that data from autistic people provides no support for the view that metacognition can 
remain intact in the absence of mindreading. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that if 
mindreading is damaged, then so also will metacognition. Now admittedly, this by itself is just as 
consistent with model #2 (“one mechanism, two modes of access”) as with model #4 
(“mindreading is prior”). But our discussion in Section 9 failed to find the alleged evidence that 
might speak in favor of the former (i.e. individuals in whom mindreading is intact but 
metacognitive access is blocked). And we have discussed a variety of other forms of evidence 
that support the latter. 
 
11.  Conclusion 
 
This target-article has evaluated four different accounts of the relationship between mindreading 
and metacognition, three of which endorse the existence of introspection for attitudes whereas 
the fourth denies it. Since we know that people have the illusion of introspecting even when they 
demonstrably aren’t, and since design-considerations suggest that the mindreading faculty would 
picture the mind as having introspective access to itself, I have argued that no weight should be 
placed on the introspective intuition. In which case the “mindreading is prior” account should be 
accepted by default, as the simplest of the four possibilities. In addition, I have argued that 
various predictions made by the three accounts that endorse introspection for attitudes aren’t 
borne out by the data. In contrast, the central prediction made by the “mindreading is prior” 
account is confirmed. This is that subjects should be caused to misattribute attitudes to 
themselves by misleading sensory or behavioral data. While an introspection-theorist can attempt 
to save this data post hoc, such attempts are less than convincing. Hence the “mindreading is 
prior” account is, overall, the best-supported of the four alternatives. 
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